| Lecture | Date |
Topic | Readings | Lecture Slides |
Comments & Additional notes |
| 1 | Sept. 14 |
º Introduction to Course º Administrative Details |
-- | Slides | -- |
| 1+ | Sept. 16 |
º Introduction to Course º Examples of Social and Economic Networks |
Ch.1 | Slides | -- |
| 2 | Sept. 18 | º Network Concepts and Examples | Ch.2 | Slides | |
| 3 | Sept. 21 |
º Finish up discussion of graph theoretic concepts º Strong and Weak Ties º Triadic Closure º Tie Strength |
Ch.3.1-3.3 | Slides | |
| 4 | Sept. 25 |
º Continue strong and weak ties º Local bridges º Structural Phenomena in Social Networks º Social Capital |
Ch.3.4-3.5 | Slides | |
| 5 | Sept. 28 |
º Homophily, selection, social influence º (plus wrap up of Ch.3) |
Ch.4.1-4.2 | Slides | |
| 6 | Sept. 30 |
º Affiliation networks º Link formation, closure |
Ch.4.3-4.4 | Slides | |
| 7 | Oct. 5 | º Segregation models | Ch.4.5 | Slides | We will not be covering Ch.5. |
| 8 | Oct. 7 |
º Games º Best responses, equilibria |
Ch.6.1-6.4 | Slides | We will not be covering Ch.5. |
| 9 | Oct. 14 |
º Equilibria º Equilibrium selection º Mixed strategies |
Ch.6.4-6.7 | Slides | |
| 10 | Oct. 19 |
º Mixed strategies º Optimality º Extensive Form Games |
Ch.6.8-6.9, Section C of 6.10 | Slides | |
| 11 | Oct. 21 | º Game theory on networks: Braess' paradoxx | Ch.8.1-Ch.8.2 | Slides | |
| 11+ | Oct. 26 | º Seller NE for item pricing when a buyer has a budget | |||
| 12 | Nov. 2 | º Pareto and social optimality, the optimal routing for the Braess paradox network, price of anarchy | Ch.6.9, Ch.9 | Slides | |
| 13 | Nov. 4 |
º Mechanism design, start of auctions º Second-price auctions |
Ch.9.1-9.4 | Slides | -- |
| Nov. 9 | º No class | Fall Break | -- | ||
| 14 | Nov. 11 |
º First-price auctions º Equilibria (uniform valuations) |
Ch.9.5, 9.7.A | Slides | Skip "General Distribution" subsection of 9.7.A unless you are very interested |
| 15 | Nov. 16 |
º Wrap up first-price auctions º Revenue for the seller º Reverse prices º Start of combinatorial auctions |
Ch.9.6 (ignore all-pay auctions and just skim 9.7.B) | Slides | |
| 16 | Nov.18 | ºContinue combinatorial auctions | no readings | Slides | |
| 17 | Nov.23 |
º Matching Markets º Bipartite matchings º Preferences, Prices, and Market-clearing Prices |
Ch.10.1-10.3 | Slides | -- |
| 18 | Nov.25 |
º Properties of Clearing Prices º Computing Clearing Prices º Computing Perfect Matchings |
Ch.10.4-10.6 | Slides | The tyop on slide 24 is fixed. Read Advanced Material (10.6) |
| 19 | Nov.30 |
º Complete matching markets º Compute market clearing prices º Perfect matching problem, two-sided matchings, Start stable matching |
Slides | The typo on slide 5 is fixed. | |
| 20 | Dec.2 |
º Continue stable matching º Gale-Shapely algorithm º The kindney exchange problem |
Slides | ||
| 21 | Dec.7 |
º Continue stable matching º The kindney exchange problem |
Slides | ||
| 22 | Jan. 11 |
º Recent Extentions to Stable Matching Problem |
Slides | ||
| 23 | Jan. 13 |
º hypertext, the web graph, evolution of the web |
Ch.13 | Slides | |
| 24 | Jan. 18 |
º web search and ranking; hubs and authorities, page rank |
Ch.14.1-14.5 | Slides | |
| 25 | Jan. 20 |
ºReview hubs and authorities, and pagerank, sketch of convergence analysis,
Begin discussion of sponsored search and sponsored search as a matching
market |
Ch.14 and Ch.15 | Slides | |
| 26 | Jan. 25 |
ºReview sponsored search, VCG and GSP mechanisms for auctioning
advertising slots |
Ch.15 | Slides | |
| 27 | Jan. 27 |
º information cascades, herding, Bayes Rules |
Ch.16 | Slides | |
| 28 | Feb. 1 |
º Continue cascade discussion,
and start direct benefit effects/externalities |
Ch.16 and Ch.17 | Slides | |
| 29 | Feb. 3 |
º Continue discussion of direct benefit effects |
Ch.17 | Slides | |
| 30 | Feb. 8 |
ºFinish discussion of direct benefits
effects + tutorial session |
Ch.17 | Slides | |
| 31 | Feb.10 |
º Popularity, Power Laws |
Ch.18.1-18.2 | Slides | -- |
| 32 | Feb.22 |
º Rich-Get-Richer Models º The Long Tail º Recommender Systems |
Ch.18.3-18.6 | Slides | -- |
| 33 | Feb.24 |
º Finish discussion of power laws and recommendation systems ºModels of Influence spread in a social network |
Ch.19 | Slides | -- |
| 34 | Feb.29 | ºChoosing a set of initial adopters | Ch.19 | Slides | -- |
| 35 | Mar. 2 | ºContinue choosing a set of initial adopters, the mariginal gain greedy algorithm | Materials not in the text | Slides | -- |
| 36 | Mar. 7 | ºThe small world phenomena, Watts-Strogatz model | Ch.20 | Slides | -- |
| 37 | Mar. 9 | º Continue small-world phenomena, Kleinberg's analysis of grid network, Extention to non-uniform distances, Extention to social distance | Ch.20 (except the advance materials Section 20.7) | Slides | -- |
| 38 | Mar. 14 | º Voting, group decision making, voting rules, plurality voting | Ch.23.1--23.3 (plus material not covered in text) | Slides | -- |
| 39 | Mar. 16 | º Positional voting rules, Borda voting rule, desirable voting axioms | Ch.23.1--23.6 (plus material not covered in text) | Slides also see this result for Mississipi election where there was a tie in vote. | -- |
| 40 | Mar. 21 | º Desirable voting axioms, impossibility results, manipulation | Ch.23.1--23.6 | Slides | -- |
| 41 | Mar. 23 | º Single-peaked preferences, information aggregation | Ch.23.1--23.6 | Slides | -- |
| 42 | Mar. 28 | ºContact networks; biologically motivated contagious spread processes in a network | Slides | -- | |
| 43 | Mar. 30 | ºFinish discussion of contagious spread; genetic inheritance, Mitochondrial Eve | Slides and also Slides | -- | |
| 44 | Apr. 4 | ºMarket and Information | Ch. 22 | Slides | -- |
| 45 | Apr. 6 | ºFinish discussion of Market and Information | Ch. 22 | Slides | -- |
