

CSC384
Knowledge Representation
Part 1

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These slides are drawn from or inspired by a multitude of sources including :

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Michael Winter

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What is Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR&R)?

Symbolic encoding of propositions believed by some agent and their **manipulation** to produce propositions that are believed by the agent but **not explicitly stated**.

Why KR&R:

- Large amounts of knowledge are used to understand the world around us.
- **Reasoning** provides **compression** in the **knowledge** we need to store.
- **Without** reasoning we would have to store an **infeasible amount of information**:
Example: Elephants can't fit into teacups, Elephants can't fit into cars, instead of just knowing that larger objects can't fit into smaller objects.

- **Information:**
 - (1) Block A is above block B ;
 - (2) Block B is above block C .

- **Query:** Is A above C ?

Given the information, human can easily draw the conclusion.
How can a **machine** do the same?

Introduction

- Tony, Mike, and John are members of the Alpine Club.
- Every member of the Alpine Club who is not a skier is a mountain climber.
- Mountain climbers do not like rain, and anyone who does not like snow is not a skier.
- Mike dislikes whatever Tony likes, and likes whatever Tony dislikes.
- Tony likes rain and snow.
- Is there a member of the Alpine Club who is a mountain climber but not a skier?

Logical representations

- are **mathematically precise**; thus it's possible to analyze their limitations, properties, and complexity of inferences.
- are **formal languages**; thus computer programs can manipulate sentences in the language.
- typically, have **well-developed proof theories**: formal procedures for reasoning to produce new sentences.

In this module we will study **First-Order logic (FOL)**, and a reasoning mechanism called **resolution** that operates on First-Order logic.

Propositional Variable: A variable which takes only **True** or **False** as values.

The set of all propositional formulas is defined recursively as follows:

- Every **propositional variable** is a propositional formula;
- If φ is a propositional formula, then so is $\neg\varphi$;
- If φ_1 and φ_2 are propositional formulas, then so are
 - $\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ (**Conjunction**);
 - $\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2$ (**Disjunction**);
 - $\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$ (**Implication**);
 - $\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ (**Bi-implication**).

Truth Assignment: A function τ from the propositional variables into the set of truth values $\{T, F\}$.

Let τ be a truth assignment. The extension $\bar{\tau}$ of τ assigns either T or F to every formula and is defined as follows:

- If $A = x$, where x is a variable, then $\bar{\tau}(A) = \tau(x)$.
- $\bar{\tau}(\neg A) = T$ iff $\bar{\tau}(A) = F$;
- $\bar{\tau}(A \wedge B) = T$ iff $\bar{\tau}(A) = T$ and $\bar{\tau}(B) = T$;
- $\bar{\tau}(A \vee B) = T$ iff $\bar{\tau}(A) = T$ or $\bar{\tau}(B) = T$;
- $\bar{\tau}(A \rightarrow B) = F$ iff $\bar{\tau}(A) = T$ and $\bar{\tau}(B) = F$.

Review: Propositional Logic – Semantic

Example: Let $V = \{p, r, q\}$ be a set of propositional variables and $\tau_1 : V \rightarrow \{T, F\}$ and $\tau_2 : V \rightarrow \{T, F\}$ be two truth assignments s.t.:

- $\tau_1(p) = T, \tau_1(q) = F, \tau_1(r) = F.$
- $\tau_2(p) = F, \tau_2(q) = T, \tau_2(r) = F.$

Then

$$\begin{array}{l} \bar{\tau}_1((\neg p \wedge q) \rightarrow r) = T \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{F} \quad \text{T} \\ \text{F} \quad \text{T} \end{array} \\ \bar{\tau}_2((\neg p \wedge q) \rightarrow r) = F \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{T} \\ \text{T} \quad \text{T} \\ \text{T} \quad \text{T} \quad \text{F} \end{array} \end{array}$$

Review: Propositional Logic – Semantic

A truth assignment τ **satisfies** a formula A iff $\tau(A) = T$.


τ satisfies a **set** Φ of formulas iff τ satisfies **all formula in** Φ .

A set Φ of formulas is **satisfiable** iff **some** truth assignment τ satisfies Φ .


Otherwise, Φ is **unsatisfiable**.

Example:

$$\Phi_1 = \{r \rightarrow (p \wedge q), \neg p\}$$



$$\Phi_2 = \{r \rightarrow (p \wedge q), r \wedge \neg p\}$$



$$\tau(r) = F \quad \tau(p) = F \quad \tau(q) = T$$

unsatisfiable

Review: Propositional Logic – Semantic

A formula A is a **logical consequence** of Φ (denoted by $\Phi \models A$) iff for every truth assignment τ , if τ satisfies Φ , then τ satisfies A .

Example: Let $\Phi = \{r \rightarrow ((p \wedge q) \vee s), r \wedge p\}$.

(Handwritten annotations: Blue bars under r , p , s and r , p . Red brackets above p and q with a '0' between them, and a '1' above s .)

Then $\Phi \models q \vee s$

*(Handwritten in red: $p \wedge q = T \rightarrow q = T$
or
 $s = T$)*

Limitations of Propositional Language

- **Only Boolean variables:** Without non-Boolean variables **cross references between individuals** in statements are **impossible**.

Example: 'If a person has a sibling and that sibling has a child, then the person is an aunt or an uncle.'

S: a person has a sibling.

C: a sibling has a child.

A: a person is an aunt or an uncle.

$$S \wedge C \rightarrow A$$

This approach doesn't work:

person in *S* and *A* are not related.

sibling in *S* and *C* are not related.

- **No quantifiers:** To state a property for all (or some) members of the domain we have to **explicitly list** them.

Example: 'Every member of the Alpine Club who is not a skier is a mountain climber'

First-Order Logic: Syntax

For **first-order logic** following components are required:

- A set V of **variables**.
- A set F of **function symbols**.
- A set P of **predicate (relation) symbols**.

- **Functions** and **variables** are used to construct **terms**.
- **Predicates** are defined **over terms**.
- **Predicates** and **terms** are used to construct **formulas**.

A set \mathcal{L} of **function** and **predicate symbols** is called a first-order **vocabulary**.

First-Order Logic: Intuition

- **Terms** (variables and functions) denote **elements of the domain**.
- **Atomic formulas** denote **properties** and **relations** that hold about the **elements** in the domain.
- Other formulas generate more **complex assertions** by composing atomic formulas.

Let \mathcal{L} be a set of function and predicate symbols.

1. Every **variable** is a term.
2. If f is an n -ary **function symbol** in \mathcal{L} and t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n are \mathcal{L} -terms, then $f(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n)$ is a \mathcal{L} -term.

Note: 0-ary functions symbols are called **constant symbols**.

Example:

$$f(x, g(x, y))$$

$$f(c_1, c_2), \text{ } c_1 \text{ and } c_2 \text{ are constants}$$

First-Order Logic: Syntax

Let \mathcal{L} be a vocabulary. The set of first-order \mathcal{L} -formulas is defined recursively:

- 1. Atomic Formula:** $P(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n)$, where P is an n -ary predicate symbol in \mathcal{L} and t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n are \mathcal{L} -terms.
- 2. Negation:** $\neg f$, where f is a \mathcal{L} -formula.
- 3. Conjunction:** $f_1 \wedge f_2 \wedge \dots \wedge f_n$, where f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n are \mathcal{L} -formulas.
- 4. Disjunction:** $f_1 \vee f_2 \vee \dots \vee f_n$, where f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n are \mathcal{L} -formulas.
- 5. Implication:** $f_1 \rightarrow f_2$, where f_1, f_2 are \mathcal{L} -formulas.
- 6. Existential:** $\exists x f$, where x is a variable and f is a \mathcal{L} -formula.
- 7. Universal:** $\forall x f$, where x is a variable and f is a \mathcal{L} -formula.

Converting English to First-Order Language

- **Individuals:** **Constants** (0-ary Functions)
 - **tony, mike, john**
rain, snow
- **Types:** **Unary Predicates**
 - $AC(x)$: x belongs to Alpine Club.
 - $S(x)$: x is a skier.
 - $C(x)$: x is a mountain climber.
- **Relationships:** **Binary Predicates**
 - $L(x, y)$: x likes y .

Converting English to First-Order Language

- **Basic Facts:**

- Tony, Mike, and John belong to the Alpine Club:

$AC(\mathbf{tony}), AC(\mathbf{mike}), AC(\mathbf{john})$

- Tony likes rain and snow:

$L(\mathbf{tony}, \mathbf{rain}), L(\mathbf{tony}, \mathbf{snow})$

- **Complex Facts:**

- Every member of the Alpine Club who is not a skier is a mountain climber.

$$\forall x [AC(x) \wedge \neg S(x) \rightarrow C(x)]$$

- Mountain climbers do not like rain, and anyone who does not like snow is not a skier.

$$\forall x [C(x) \rightarrow \neg L(x, \mathbf{rain})] \wedge \forall x [\neg L(x, \mathbf{snow}) \rightarrow \neg S(x)]$$

- Mike dislikes whatever Tony likes, and likes whatever Tony dislikes.

$$\forall x [L(\text{tony}, x) \rightarrow \neg L(\text{mike}, x)] \wedge \forall x [\neg L(\text{tony}, x) \rightarrow L(\text{mike}, x)]$$

- Is there a member of the Alpine Club who is a mountain climber but not a skier?


$$\exists x [AC(x) \wedge C(x) \wedge \neg S(x)]$$

First-Order Logic: Syntax


Like variables in programming languages, the variables in FOL have a **scope** which is **determined by the quantifiers**.

Lexical scope for variables:

$Animal(x) \wedge \exists x[Human(x) \vee Women(x)] .$

A red bracket is drawn under the expression $\exists x[Human(x) \vee Women(x)]$ in the formula above, indicating its lexical scope.

$\exists x[Animal(x) \rightarrow \neg Human(x)] \wedge \exists x[Human(x) \vee Women(x)]$

Two brackets are drawn under the quantifier scopes in the formula above. A red bracket is under $\exists x[Animal(x) \rightarrow \neg Human(x)]$ and a blue bracket is under $\exists x[Human(x) \vee Women(x)]$.

- In the **propositional logic**, a **truth assignment** provides meaning to a formula.
- In **FOL** we can talk about **(non-Boolean) individuals and elements**.
So the simple universe of truth values is not rich enough to provide a suitable interpretation for FOL formulas.
- We need more **more complicated objects** to give meaning to formulas and terms.
- These objects are called **structures**.

First-Order Structures

Let \mathcal{L} be a first-order vocabulary. An \mathcal{L} -**structure** \mathcal{M} consists of the following:

1. A **nonempty set** M called the **universe (domain) of discourse**.
2. For each n -ary **function symbol** $f \in \mathcal{L}$, an associated function $f^{\mathcal{M}} : M^n \rightarrow M$.
Note: If $n = 0$, then f is a constant symbol and $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ is simply an element of M .
 $f^{\mathcal{M}}$ is called the **extension** of the function symbol f in \mathcal{M} .
3. For each n -ary **predicate symbol** $P \in \mathcal{L}$, an associated relation $P^{\mathcal{M}} \subseteq M^n$.
 $P^{\mathcal{M}}$ is called the **extension** of the predicate symbol P in \mathcal{M} .

Blocks World:

Suppose \mathcal{L}_{BW} includes the following symbols:

- **Function Symbols:**

- $under(x)$: the block immediately under x if x is not on table; x itself otherwise.

- **Predicate Symbols:**

- $on(x, y)$: x is place (directly) on y .

- $above(x, y)$: x is above y .

- $clear(x)$: no blocks are above x .

- $ontable(x)$: no blocks are under x .

Suppose \mathcal{L}_{BW} includes the following symbols:

- **Function Symbols:**

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\mathcal{M}_1 is a \mathcal{L}_{BW} -structure such that:

$M_1 = \{A, B, C, D\}$

$on^{\mathcal{M}_1} = \{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle\}$


$above^{\mathcal{M}_1} = \{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle, \langle A, C \rangle\}$

$clear^{\mathcal{M}_1} = \{A, D\}$

$ontable^{\mathcal{M}_1} = \{C, D\}$

$under^{\mathcal{M}_1}(A) = B, under^{\mathcal{M}_1}(B) = C,$

$under^{\mathcal{M}_1}(C) = C, under^{\mathcal{M}_1}(D) = D$



Suppose \mathcal{L}_{BW} includes the following symbols:

- **Function Symbols:**

- $under(x)$: the block immediately under x if x is not on table; x itself otherwise.

- **Predicate Symbols:**

- $on(x, y)$: x is place (directly) on y .
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- $ontable(x)$: x is placed on the table.


M_2 :

$$M_2 = \{A, B, C, D\}$$

$$on^{M_2} = \{ \langle B, C \rangle \}$$

$$above^{M_2} = \{ \langle B, C \rangle \}$$

Represent the following configuration by a \mathcal{L}_{BW} -structure.



$$clear^{M_2} = \{A, B, D\}$$

$$ontable^{M_2} = \{A, C, D\}$$

$$\text{under } M_2 (A) = A$$

$$\text{under } M_2 (B) = C$$

$$\text{under } M_2 (C) = C$$

$$\text{under } M_2 (D) = D$$

Semantic of First-Order Logic: Intuition


Every \mathcal{L} -formula becomes either **true or false** when **interpreted** by an \mathcal{L} -structure \mathcal{M} .

That is, the truth value of a first-order **formulas** A is evaluated w.r.t to a first-order **structure** \mathcal{M} :

- **Terms** (variables and functions) of a formula denote **elements of the domain**.
So every **term** in A must correspond with an **element of the universe** of \mathcal{M} .
- **Atomic formulas** denote **properties** and **relations** that hold about the **elements** in the domain.
 $P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ is **true** in \mathcal{M} if t_1, \dots, t_n **are related** to each other by $P^{\mathcal{M}}$.
- Other formulas generate more **complex assertions** by composing atomic formulas.
Their truth is dependent on the truth of the atomic formulas in them.

Semantic of First-Order Logic: Variable Assignments

Let \mathcal{M} be a structure and X be a set of variables. An **object assignment** σ for \mathcal{M} is a **mapping** from variables in X to the universe of \mathcal{M} .



$$X = \{v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4\}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma(v_1) &= D, & \sigma(v_2) &= C \\ \sigma(v_3) &= B, & \sigma(v_4) &= A \end{aligned}$$

Remember the recursive definition of term:

Let \mathcal{L} be a set of function and predicate symbols.

1. Every **variable** x is a term.
2. If f is an n -ary **function symbol** in \mathcal{L} and t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n are \mathcal{L} -terms, then $f(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n)$ is a \mathcal{L} -term.

Let \mathcal{L} be a vocabulary and \mathcal{M} be an \mathcal{L} -structure.

The extension $\bar{\sigma}$ of σ is defined recursively:


1. for every variable x , $\bar{\sigma}(x) = \sigma(x)$;
2. for every function symbol $f \in \mathcal{L}$, $\bar{\sigma}(f(t_1, \dots, t_n)) = f^{\mathcal{M}}(\bar{\sigma}(t_1), \dots, \bar{\sigma}(t_n))$.

Semantic of First-Order Logic: Variable Assignments

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The extension $\bar{\sigma}$ of σ is defined recursively:

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$$\begin{aligned} \text{under}^{\mathcal{M}}(A) &= B & \text{under}^{\mathcal{M}}(B) &= C \\ \text{under}^{\mathcal{M}}(C) &= C & \text{under}^{\mathcal{M}}(D) &= D \end{aligned}$$

$$X = \{v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4\}$$

$$\sigma(v_1) = D, \quad \sigma(v_2) = C$$

$$\sigma(v_3) = B, \quad \sigma(v_4) = A$$

$$\bar{\sigma}(\text{under}(\text{under}(v_4))) = \text{under}^{\mathcal{M}}(\underbrace{\bar{\sigma}(\text{under}(v_4))}_{B}) = \text{under}^{\mathcal{M}}(B) = C$$

Handwritten annotations: A red arrow points from $\sigma(v_4) = A$ to D . Another red arrow points from D to $\bar{\sigma}(\text{under}(v_4))$. A third red arrow points from D to $\text{under}^{\mathcal{M}}(B)$.

$$\overline{\mathcal{B}}(\text{under}(V_4)) = \text{under}^M(\underbrace{\overline{\mathcal{B}}(V_4)}_A) = \text{under}^M(A) = \mathcal{B}$$

$$\overline{\mathcal{B}}(V_4) = \mathcal{B}(V_4) = A$$



First-Order Logic Semantic: Models (Interpretations)

For an \mathcal{L} -formula A , $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma]$ (\mathcal{M} **satisfies** A under σ , or \mathcal{M} is a **model** of A under σ) is defined recursively on the structure of A as follows:

| | | |
|--|-----|---|
| $\mathcal{M} \models P(t_1, \dots, t_n)[\sigma]$ | iff | $\langle \bar{\sigma}(t_1), \dots, \bar{\sigma}(t_n) \rangle \in P^{\mathcal{M}}$. |
| $\mathcal{M} \models (s = t)[\sigma]$ | iff | $\bar{\sigma}(s) = \bar{\sigma}(t)$. |
| $\mathcal{M} \models \neg A[\sigma]$ | iff | $\mathcal{M} \not\models A[\sigma]$. |
| $\mathcal{M} \models (A \vee B)[\sigma]$ | iff | $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma]$ or $\mathcal{M} \models B[\sigma]$. |
| $\mathcal{M} \models (A \wedge B)[\sigma]$ | iff | $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma]$ and $\mathcal{M} \models B[\sigma]$. |
| $\mathcal{M} \models (\forall x A)[\sigma]$ | iff | $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma(m/x)]$ for all $m \in M$. |
| $\mathcal{M} \models (\exists x A)[\sigma]$ | iff | $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma(m/x)]$ for some $m \in M$. |

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| $\mathcal{M} \models (A \vee B)[\sigma]$ | iff | $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma]$ or $\mathcal{M} \models B[\sigma]$. |
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| $\mathcal{M} \models (\forall x A)[\sigma]$ | iff | $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma(m/x)]$ for all $m \in M$. |
| $\mathcal{M} \models (\exists x A)[\sigma]$ | iff | $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma(m/x)]$ for some $m \in M$. |

Note: $\sigma(m/x)$ is a object variable assignment function. Exactly like σ , but maps the variable x to the individual $m \in M$. That is:

For $y \neq x$: $\sigma(m/x)(y) = \sigma(y)$

For x : $\sigma(m/x)(x) = \sigma(m)$

Models: Example

Let \mathcal{M}_3 be a structure such that:

$$M_3 = \{A, B, C, D\}$$

$$on^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle\}$$

$$above^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle, \langle A, C \rangle\}$$

$$clear^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{A, D\}$$

$$ontable^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{C, D\}$$

Does \mathcal{M}_3 satisfy

$$\forall x \forall y (on(x, y) \rightarrow above(x, y))$$

$$x = A$$

$$y = A \checkmark$$

$$y = B \checkmark$$

$$y = C \checkmark$$

$$y = D \checkmark$$

$$x = B$$

$$y = A \checkmark$$

$$y = B \checkmark$$

$$y = C \checkmark$$

$$y = D \checkmark$$

$$x = C$$

$$y = A \checkmark$$

$$y = B \checkmark$$

$$y = C \checkmark$$

$$y = D \checkmark$$

$$x = D$$

$$y = A \checkmark$$

$$y = B \checkmark$$

$$y = C \checkmark$$

$$y = D \checkmark$$

Let \mathcal{M}_3 be a structure such that:

$$M_3 = \{A, B, C, D\}$$

$$on^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle\}$$

$$above^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle, \langle A, C \rangle\}$$

$$clear^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{\underline{\langle A, D \rangle}\}$$

$$ontable^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{C, D\}$$

Does \mathcal{M}_3 satisfy

$$\forall x \forall y (above(x, y) \rightarrow on(x, y)) \quad \text{X}$$

$$x = A \quad y = C \quad \text{X}$$

$$\langle A, C \rangle \in above^{\mathcal{M}_3}$$

$$\langle A, C \rangle \notin on^{\mathcal{M}_3}$$

Let \mathcal{M}_3 be a structure such that:

$$M_3 = \{A, B, C, D\}$$

$$on^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle\}$$

$$above^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle, \langle A, C \rangle\}$$

$$clear^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{A, D\}$$

$$ontable^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{C, D\}$$

Does \mathcal{M}_3 satisfy

$$\forall x \exists y (clear(x) \vee On(y, x)) \quad \checkmark$$

$$x = A \quad y = A \quad \checkmark$$

$$x = B \quad y = A \quad \checkmark$$

$$x = C \quad y = B \quad \checkmark$$

$$x = D \quad y = A \quad \checkmark$$

Let \mathcal{M}_3 be a structure such that:

$$M_3 = \{A, B, C, D\}$$

$$on^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle\}$$

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$$clear^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{A, D\}$$

$$ontable^{\mathcal{M}_3} = \{C, D\}$$

Does \mathcal{M}_3 satisfy

$$\exists y \forall x (clear(x) \vee On(y, x)) \quad \text{X}$$

$$y = A \quad x = C \quad \text{X}$$

$$y = B \quad x = B \quad \text{X}$$

$$y = C \quad x = C \quad \text{X}$$

$$y = D \quad x = D \quad \text{X}$$

First-Order Logic Semantic: Models

An occurrence of x in A is **bound** iff it is in a sub-formula of A of the form $\forall xB$ or $\exists xB$. Otherwise the occurrence is **free**.

Example:

$$P(x) \wedge \exists x[P(x) \vee Q(x)]$$

free

bounded

In a structure \mathcal{M} , formulas with **free variables** might be **true for some** object assignments to the free variables and **false for others**.

Example: Consider the formula $\overbrace{P(x, y) \wedge P(y, x)}^A$ and the following structure \mathcal{M} :

$$M = \{a, b\} \quad P^{\mathcal{M}} = \{\langle a, a \rangle\}$$

$$G_1(x) = a \quad G_1(y) = a \quad \mathcal{M} \models A[G_1]$$

$$G_2(x) = a \quad G_2(y) = b \quad \mathcal{M} \not\models A[G_2]$$

First-Order Logic Semantic: Models

A formula A is **closed** if it contains no free occurrence of a variable.

A **closed formula** is called a **sentence**.

Example:

$P(x) \wedge \exists x[P(x) \vee Q(x)]$.

$\forall xP(x) \wedge \exists x[P(x) \vee Q(x)]$

If σ and σ' agree on the **free variables** of A , then $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma]$ iff $\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma']$.

Proof: Structural induction on A .

Corollary: If A is a **sentence**, then for any object assignments σ and σ' ,

$$\mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma] \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathcal{M} \models A[\sigma']$$

So, if A is a **sentence** (no free variables), σ is **irrelevant** and we omit mention of σ and simply write $\mathcal{M} \models A$.

Let Φ be a **set of sentences**.

- \mathcal{M} **satisfies** Φ (denoted by $\mathcal{M} \models \Phi$) if for **every** sentence $A \in \Phi$, $\mathcal{M} \models A$.
- If $\mathcal{M} \models \Phi$, we say \mathcal{M} is a **model** of Φ .
- We say that Φ is **satisfiable** if there is a structure \mathcal{M} such that $\mathcal{M} \models \Phi$.

Models of Logical Sentences: Example

Let Φ_1 be a set containing the following sentences

(c_1, c_2 are constant symbols, we use **bold** font to distinguish constant symbols from variables):

- $on(c_1, c_2)$
- $clear(c_1)$
- $above(c_1, c_2)$

Construct **two models** of Φ_1 with **size three** (i.e., the size of the domain of each model must be three).

$$M_1 = \{A, B, C\}$$

$$c_1^{M_1} = A \quad c_2^{M_1} = B$$

$$on^{M_1} = \{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle\}$$

$$clear^{M_1} = \{A, C\}$$

$$above^{M_1} = \{\langle A, B \rangle\}$$

Models of Logical Sentences: Practice Question

Let Φ_2 be a set containing the following sentences (c_1, c_2 are constant symbols):

- $\forall x(\text{clear}(x) \rightarrow \neg \exists y(\text{on}(y, x)))$
- $\forall x \forall y(\text{on}(x, y) \rightarrow \text{above}(x, y))$
- $\forall x \forall y \forall z((\text{above}(x, y) \wedge \text{above}(y, z)) \rightarrow \text{above}(x, z))$
- $\text{on}(c_1, c_2)$
- $\text{clear}(c_1)$
- $\text{above}(c_1, c_2)$

Construct **two models** of Φ_2 with **size three** (i.e., the size of the domain of each model must be three).

$$M_2 = \{A, B, C\} \quad c_1^{M_2} = A \quad c_2^{M_2} = B$$

$$\text{on}^{M_2} = \{ \langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle \}$$

$$\text{clear}^{M_2} = \{ A \}$$

$$\text{above}^{M_2} = \{ \langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle, \langle A, C \rangle \}$$

Example: is $\{\forall x(P(x) \rightarrow Q(x)), P(\mathbf{a}), \neg Q(\mathbf{a})\}$ satisfiable?